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ABSTRACT
Safety assurance is a paramount factor in the large-scale de-
ployment of various autonomous systems (e.g., self-driving
vehicles1). However, the execution of safety engineering
practices and processes have been challenged by an increas-
ing complexity of modern safety-critical systems. is at-
tribute has become more critical for autonomous systems
that involve articial intelligence (AI) and data-driven tech-
niques along with the complex interactions of the physical
world and digital computing platforms. In this position pa-
per, we highlight some challenges of applying current safety
processes to modern autonomous systems. en, we intro-
duce the concept of SafetyOps – a set of practices, which
combines DevOps, TestOps, DataOps, and MLOps to provide
an ecient, continuous and traceable system safety lifecycle.
We believe that SafetyOps can play a signicant role in scal-
able integration and adaptation of safety engineering into
various industries relying on AI and data.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, articial intelligence (AI) and automation
have become an integral part of our life. e range of appli-
cations varies from chatbots, smart homes to robotic surgery,
and automated cars. Any safety-critical (e.g., automated
cars, surgical robots, and avionics systems) applications of
such technology require a rigorous safety assurance before
large-scale deployment. Consequently, manufacturers and
developers usually follow a safety engineering lifecycle per
international standards such as ISO 26262 [7], ISO/PAS 21448
[8], IEC 61508 [6], and EN 50128 [5] depending upon the
application domain. e ultimate goal is to ensure the func-
tional safety (FuSa) and safety-of-the-intended functionality
(SOTIF), which deal with the absence of unreasonable risks
due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior of so-
ware/hardware components, algorithmic insuciencies, and
foreseeable misuse of the underlying technology.
1e paper is specic to autonomous vehicles. However, the position taken
in this paper may be applicable to other autonomous systems.
In theory, safety assurance is a continuous and iterative
process that systematically provides condence that an un-
derlying product meets the safety requirements. However,
manual execution of the safety processes makes it challeng-
ing to maintain the continuity of safety assurance through-
out the product lifecycle. e functional safety requirements
and associated tests for autonomous vehicles heavily depend
on (training) data and operational design domain (ODD)
[1, 10]. However, dynamically linking a given ODD and
data to safety requirements, system architecture, safety ar-
tifacts, and test results is a nontrivial task. Moreover, the
development of autonomous systems can benet from both
requirement specication at design time and requirement min-
ing from the real data. ough integrating feedback loops
in requirement management tools is a challenging task and
involves the development of custom plugins using repre-
sentational state transfer (REST) application programming
interfaces (APIs).
In this paper, we highlight that eective, ecient, and
continuous safety assurance of complex systems call for sig-
nicant updates in the safety processes, analysis techniques,
and verication methodologies. We propose SafetyOps as
an emerging area that can combine the power of various
automation frameworks (e.g., DevOps, TestOps, DataOps) to
provide continuous delivery of safety assurance cases. More-
over, SafetyOps can reduce the gap between safety, soware,
hardware, and test engineers.
e organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2
enumerates the current and upcoming challenges related to
safety assurance. We provide the principles of SafetyOps in
Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 CHALLENGES
• Gap in safety engineering and soware devel-
opment frameworks: Safety standards provide some
guidelines for preparing safety documents (e.g., safety
concept) and performing various safety analyses
(e.g., hazard and risk analysis (HARA) and fault tree
analysis (FTA)). However, the execution of these pro-
cesses is quite dierent from modern soware work-
ows. For example, visualizing and reviewing a large
FMEA or FTA is not as structured as Git code reviews.
Indeed, safety processes are largely isolated from the
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design phase and connected only by manual pro-
cesses, Excel spreadsheets, and human middleware.
Traditionally, we would argue that safety activities
have to be performed independent from the design
and development teams. ese seemingly contra-
dicting requirements induce a massive challenge for
developing autonomous systems – to perform a holis-
tic SOTIF analysis of robotic algorithms intrinsically
requires the involvement and engagement of both
developers and safety engineers.
• Detachment of various safety analysismethods:
In practice, various safety analyses (e.g., FMEA and
FTA) documents for a given system are produced
by the safety team. However, consistency check-
ing among these analysis documents is usually done
manually. For autonomous systems, these analysis
documents need to be linked dynamically. Usually,
FTA and FMEA are manually performed at design
time to gain more insights into the system. How-
ever, current AI-enabled autonomous systems collect
plenty of data during the trial phase and provide the
opportunity to learn a system fault tree from the
data [11]. Similarly, quantitative FMEA requires to
mine the frequency of failure modes from the real
data. e traditional FMEA and FTA methods have
some limitations to capture the complicated details
of the modern system, e.g., [13] proposed a special-
ized FMEA for perceptual components in automated
driving. Similarly, various ODD analysis methods
(e.g., [9]) are not readily supported in existing safety
tools. We believe that the eectiveness of failure
analysis methods can be improved by considering
these aributes in a unied framework.
• Continuous and traceable delivery of safety cases:
A safety case usually depends on the system de-
sign, environmental assumptions, system congura-
tion, identied hazards, associated risks, and corre-
sponding safety measures. However, in the case of
AI-enabled autonomous systems deployed in ever-
changing public environments (e.g. self-driving vehi-
cles), these aributes can change more oen than for
some more restricted systems (e.g., factory automa-
tion robots). is situation would benet from the
development of machine-readable, hierarchical [4],
and dynamic [3] safety cases. Indeed, this requires a
well-connected framework for system design, data
mining, safety, and testing artifacts.
• From simulation to real experiments and back:
e certication and safety assurance would require
autonomous systems to operate over real-world en-
vironment dictated by the chosen ODD. However,
innite state-space due to an open context makes
it impossible to test all corner cases in a real-world
seing. ere is a growing consensus in the indus-
try that simulation [15] (either using fenced-road-
network or using soware) need to play a role along
with the real-world testing. It leads to an absolute
dependence on creating a scenario library [12] to
drive the simulation-based testing. e scenarios
can be hand-craed or learned from the real data
– furthermore, randomization can be used to verify
robustness related properties of the system. Here,
a few aspects are critical: 1) validation of such sce-
narios with respect to an ODD, 2) establishing a link
between scenarios and other functional safety and
SOTIF artifacts, and 3) quantication of the domain
coverage.
3 PRINCIPLES OF SAFETYOPS
In the last few years, DevOps [2] has revolutionized the
soware development and services industry [14]. Indeed,
DevOps has now become a part of almost every industry
ranging from web technologies and banking sectors to au-
tomotive and avionics. Following this development, simi-
lar approaches have emerged in other elds, such as data
engineering, machine learning, and system testing. In the
following, we dene them2:
• DevOps is a set of practices that combines soware
development (Dev) and information-technology op-
erations (Ops), which aims to shorten the systems
development life cycle and provide continuous de-
livery with high soware quality.
• TestOps is a combination of Test and Operations
(Ops) – a more evolved version of traditional testing
to assure the quality of services.
• DataOps is an automated, process-oriented method-
ology, used by data engineers, to improve the quality
and reduce the cycle time of data analytics. DataOps
applies to the entire data lifecycle, from data prepa-
ration to reporting.
• MLOps typically refers to the collaboration between
data/machine learning scientists and operations en-
gineers to manage the lifecycle of ML within an or-
ganization.
It is important to note that the frameworks mentioned
above are closed-loop, which allows for fast feedback and
continuous improvement based on the learning/data pro-
duced in each iteration. Moreover, feedback loops ensure
quality and measurable performance throughout the system
lifecycle. A signicant source of their widespread acceptance
in industry is the abundance of open-source contributions.
2Note that this list is not exhaustive. Other elds whereOps-ing has emerged
include PrivacyOps, SecurityOps, SysOps, and ModelOps.
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Figure 1: An Overview of SafetyOps: Note that the branches (on the right) representing various safety analysis
techniques are not exhaustive. e primary purpose is to show that these techniques require a dynamic link with
the activities of DevOps, TestOps, DataOps, and MLOps.
Onewouldwish to adopt these frameworks directly for safety
engineering to cope with the challenges posed by the mod-
ern autonomous systems (mentioned in Section 2). However,
we believe that safety has its own unique needs that require
a dedicated framework (we call it as SafetyOps).
SafetyOps combines DevOps, TestOps, DataOps and
MLOps with safety engineering to provide a fast, ecient,
continuous and traceable system safety lifecycle.
An overview of SafetyOps is shown in Figure 1. e main
idea is to build a framework that seamlessly links safety en-
gineering activities (represented by branches in Figure 1)
to essential components for autonomous systems develop-
ment (i.e., DevOps, TestOps, DataOps, and MLOps). Indeed,
this integration greatly improves and accelerates the safety
assurance activities. Achieving a SafetyOps environment
requires changes in processes, tools, and culture. We believe
that the right tools and processes can provide measurable
improvements in the following critical areas.
• Reduction in retrospective activities: Due to a
gap between safety engineers and other teams, some
activities are usually performed in a retrospective
fashion. With the SafetyOps framework in place,
these activities can be performed continuously dur-
ing the development.
• More acceptance of safety in development teams:
Modernization of safety tools and processes provided
by SafetyOps can help in the acceptance of safety
activities in development teams. For example, the
concept of doc-as code3 can signicantly improve
the development and traceability of safety require-
ments.
• Continuous development of safety cases: Con-
tinuous integration of safety into the development
3hps://www.writethedocs.org/guide/docs-as-code/
process provided by SafetyOps allows realizing a
safety case as a live artifact. Indeed, this reduces the
manual eorts of evidence collection and manual
checking of changes/updates in any design, testing,
or safety artifact. Moreover, automation of these
activities can also help in measuring the impact of
specic components/activities on the safety case and
hence signicantly elevate the safety of the released
product.
Note that the core idea of SafetyOps is to promote the
automation (as in DevOps, TestOps, DataOps and MLOps)
of safety processes and activities in accordance with corre-
sponding standards (e.g., [7], ISO/PAS 21448 [8]). e links
in Figure 1 can be realized in various ways4 depending upon
the organizational setup (i.e., data-pipeline, development
framework, requirement management and verication &
validation strategy).
In the following, we describe the main principles of the
SafetyOps framework:
• Commondata exchange anddatamanagement:
e core of SafetyOps workow is functionality for
capturing and exchanging data between dierent
tools (e.g., dierent FMEA, FTA, and safety case de-
velopment tools). It also includes scenario bench-
marks and test results. e ongoing developments in
IEEE P28515 can support this aspect by providing an
exchangeable format for safety analysis and safety
verication activities.
• Open APIs and qualiable open-source tools:
Common data exchange and data management start
with application programming interfaces (APIs) that
enable the exchange of data between multiple so-
ware components, both vendor-supplied and in-house
developed. For example, APIs can help in using driv-
ing scenarios in various simulation engines. Simi-
larly, APIs can be used to nd the correspondence
between failure modes in FMEA and basic events in
FTA with the recorded data.
• State-of-the art visualization techniques and in-
tegrated analytics: e modern interactive so-
ware and data visualization techniques can improve
the development and outlook of safety artifacts. Such
techniques indeed provide the basis to build navi-
gable safety cases, fault trees, and hierarchical visu-
alization of hazard analysis. Moreover, integrated
analytics is essential to continuously monitor critical
safety metrics, e.g., ODD coverage per test run, fre-
quency of a particular failure mode in the recorded
4e details about the implementation of these links is beyond the scope of
this paper.
5hps://sagroups.ieee.org/2851/
data, and average reaction time for a specic situa-
tion during the on-road testing.
• Inclusiveness of data-driven safety: Finally, the
SafetyOps supports the integration of data-driven
safety aspects. For example, ideas around mining
scenarios from the data, learning fault trees, and
learning autonomous agent behavior invariance over
a given ODD.
4 CONCLUSION
In this position paper, we argue that safety engineering needs
a framework like SafetyOps to handle the complexity of
modern autonomous systems in the context of ever shorter
product life cycles. SafetyOps can play a role in solving some
crucial challenges related to the development of autonomous
vehicles. An ultimate objective of SafetyOps is to automate
the manual safety processes, provide continuous traceability
between safety artifacts and main activities of the system de-
velopment pipeline (data engineering, machine-learning, and
system integration and testing). Finally, SafetyOps can also
help in distributed development by utilizing the standardized
interfaces for safety artifacts.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Czarnecki. 2018. Operational Design Domain for Automated Driv-
ing Systems - Taxonomy of Basic Terms.
[2] J. Davis and K. Daniels. 2016. Eective DevOps: Building a Culture of
Collaboration, Anity, and Tooling at Scale (1st ed.). OReilly.
[3] E. Denney, G. Pai, and I. Habli. 2015. Dynamic Safety Cases for
rough-Life Safety Assurance. In IEEE/ACM 37th IEEE International
Conference on Soware Engineering, Vol. 2. 587–590.
[4] E. Denney, G. Pai, and I. Whiteside. 2015. Formal Foundations for
Hierarchical Safety Cases. In EEE 16th International Symposium on
High Assurance Systems Engineering. 52–59.
[5] EN50128. 2011. Railway applications. Communication, signalling
and processing systems. Soware for railway control and protection
systems.
[6] IEC61508. 2010. Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/ and Pro-
grammable Electronic (Edition 2).
[7] ISO26262. 2018. Road vehicles  Functional safety.
[8] ISO/PAS21448. 2019. Road vehicles  Safety of the intended func-
tionality.
[9] Philip Koopman, Beth Osyk, and Jack Weast. 2019. Autonomous
Vehicles Meet the Physical World: RSS, Variability, Uncertainty, and
Proving Safety (Expanded Version). arXiv:cs.RO/1911.01207
[10] P. Koopman and M. Wagner. 2016. Challenges in Autonomous Vehicle
Testing and Validation. SAE International Journal of Transportation
Safety 4, 1 (2016), 15–24.
[11] M. Nauta, D. Bucur, and M. Stoelinga. 2018. LIFT: Learning Fault Trees
from Observational Data. Inantitative Evaluation of Systems QEST
(Lecture Notes in Computer Science), Vol. 11024. Springer, 306–322.
[12] S. Riedmaier, T. Ponn, D. Ludwig, B. Schick, and F. Diermeyer. 2020.
Survey on Scenario-based Safety Assessment of Automated Vehicles.
IEEE Access (2020), 1–26.
[13] R. Salay, M. Angus, and K. Czarnecki. 2019. A Safety Analysis Method
for Perceptual Components in Automated Driving. In 2019 IEEE 30th
International Symposium on Soware Reliability Engineering. 24–34.
[14] State of DevOps. 2019. hps://services.google.com//les/misc/
state-of-devops-2019.pdf.
[15] E. orn, S. Kimmel, and M. Chaka. [n. d.]. A Framework for Auto-
mated Driving System Testable Cases and Scenarios. NHTSA, 2019.
